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The public understanding of Terri Schiavo's death was re-
fracted through the polarized politics of the abortion wars. By
the time the Florida legislature intervened in her case in 2004
and the United States Congress followed suit in 2005, the debate
surrounding her had become hardened into the familiar antago-
nisms of our times-religion vs. secularism, pro-life vs. pro-
choice, liberals vs. conservatives. On the left, the claim was that
Terri had chosen to end her life rather than endure the endless
limbo of her persistent vegetative state but that outsiders were
attempting to force their own conception of a "life worth living"
on her; on the right, the claim was that Terri's medical condition
was uncertain, that she might benefit from some further therapy,
and that her "right to life" was being scorned by those pressing
for removal of her feeding tube.
This stylized conflict obscured a more immediate issue at
stake in Terri's case. This issue was presented by the family con-
flict between Terri's husband, Michael Schiavo, and her parents,
Robert and Mary Schindler, about the continuance of Terri's
life-prolonging medical treatment. The issue was not the sub-
stantive disagreement between them but the simple fact of their
conflict regardless of its merits. By the time of Terri's death, this
conflict had escalated beyond any sensible proportions and be-
yond even the most remote possibility of reconciliation between
them. Thus after Terri's death, following the removal of her
feeding tube as Michael had sought, her parents were not in-
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University. Michael Gottlieb's re-
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fited from discussions with J. Randall Curtis, M.D.
1. See George J. Annas, 'Culture of Life' Politics at the Bedside-The Case of Terri
Schiavo, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 16 (2005); Anna Quindlen, The Culture of Each Life,
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formed of the time or location of her burial.2 Soon thereafter, in
response to the Schindlers' repeated allegations, a criminal in-
vestigation was initiated by Governor Jeb Bush of Florida to de-
termine whether Michael was responsible for injuring Terri fif-
teen years earlier when she suffered her anoxic event This
increasingly bitter family conflict was the impetus for the prolif-
erating public engagement as competing advocates for Terri's
husband and parents sought allies to join their struggle. The fam-
ily conflict was generally understood, however, as merely the
backdrop for the real issue at stake-that is, whether Terri's
treatment should be continued. The family conflict was noted by
Florida courts as the self-evident justification for their initial in-
tervention to render a definitive judgment about Terri's contin-
ued treatment. The need for and propriety of governmental in-
volvement in resolving this dispute was similarly viewed as self-
evident in the subsequent involvement of Florida's governor and
legislature, and then Congress. The Florida courts rebuffed this
involvement on the basis of constitutional assertions of judicial
autonomy;' the federal courts rapidly disposed of substantive
claims for which Congress had authorized de novo review.5 But
none of the courts and virtually none of the other official and
unofficial disputants about Terri's fate explicitly asked whether
this family dispute should properly have been resolved in any
public forum. A principle of family privacy-a principle, I would
argue, of constitutional dimensions-was thereby dishonored.
I. PROTECTING TERRI SCHIAVO'S RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION
Neither Terri's husband nor her parents resisted govern-
mental intervention as such. Michael explicitly claimed that gov-
ernmental assistance was necessary and appropriate to carry out
Terri's wishes, notwithstanding that she had never completed an
advance directive or appointed any health care proxy to act on
her behalf if she became incompetent. The Schindlers asserted
both in judicial and subsequent legislative proceedings that
2. Controversy Continues as Terri Schiavo's Remains Interred in Clearwater, June
20,2005, http:/journals.aoLcom/justicel949/JUSTICEFORTERRISCHIAVOlentries958.
3. Florida Closes Its Inquiry Into Collapse of Schiavo, N.Y.TIMES, July 8, 2005, p.
A20, col. 6 ("In the new report, Mr. [Bernie] McCabe [prosecutor for Pinellas and Pasco
Counties] said that to open a full homicide investigation, there must be some fact or evi-
dence indicating that a criminal act caused the death. He said his review had found
none.").
4. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
5. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Terri's medical condition was treatable and on this substantive
basis argued that state officials should not direct abandonment
of life-prolonging treatment. Neither Michael nor the Schindlers
asserted that they were pursuing interests of their own; they
purported to speak only for and on behalf of Terri. And Florida
law specified that the only proper focus for inquiry was Terri's
prior wishes.6
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court had effectively endorsed
the proposition that mentally competent individuals have a con-
stitutional right to choose about the continuance of life-
prolonging medical treatment, including artificial feeding. The
Cruzan case itself dealt with an incompetent person who, like
Terri Schiavo, had left no formal advance indication of her
wishes; the Court divided on the issue of the quantum of proof
that a state might require to justify treatment discontinuance,
with the majority accepting Missouri's specification of "clear and
convincing evidence." By 2005, virtually every state had legisla-
tively provided that individuals are entitled to specify advance
directives and/or to appoint health care proxies to direct their
medical treatment if they should become incompetent.
Most people, however, do not take advantage of this enti-
tlement'; and for such people, most states provide for automatic
appointment of a health care proxy based on a fixed statutory
hierarchy (with spouse first, adult children second, parents third
and so on). Under most of these state laws, the statutory proxy
appointment effectively resolves any conflict among family
members about treatment decisions without any specific inquiry
about the incompetent patient's actual prior preferences.9 (Some
6. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
7. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
8. See the data cited by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 289 n.1.
9. See Alabama: Ala. Code 1975 § 22-8A-11 and -6; Alaska: Alaska Stat.
§ 13.52.030; Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3231; Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-
214; California: Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24178; Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 16,
§ 2507; Washington, D. C.: D.C. Code 1981 § 21-2210; Florida: Fla. Stat Ann. § 765.401;
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-2 (informed consent statute) and Ga. Code Ann. § 31-
36A-1 to -7; Illinois: 755 ILCS 40/1 to 40/65, specifically 40/25; Iowa: Iowa Code Ann.
§ 144A.7; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.631; Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10; Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann tit. 18-A, § 5-801 to § 5-817, specifically
§ 5-805; Maryland: Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann., § 5-605; Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 41-41-201 to -229, particularly §§ 41-41-203(s), -211, and -215(9); Montana: Mont.
Code Ann. § 50-9-106; Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.626; New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann.
1978 § 24-7A-5; New York: N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2965; North Carolina: N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-322 (assigning priority first to patient's spouse, then to "relatives of the first
degree"); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 23-12-13; Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
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state laws provide that where the statutory proxy is a multi-
member group-e.g., adult children-any disagreement is con-
clusively resolved by majority vote; and tie votes require ag-
pointment of a different, presumably more resolute, proxy. )
The justification for this imposed hierarchy offered by the draft-
ers of the widely influential proposed uniform law was that a
"presumed majority" would prefer these results.1 If an individ-
ual constitutional right to control one's medical treatment is at
stake, this rough calculation about majority preference would
arguably be insufficient; and individualized inquiry might instead
be required .
Florida law cannot, however, be faulted on this ground.
Though Florida follows other states in providing automatic ap-
pointment of a proxy for incompetent patients who had not
made their own prior arrangements, Florida explicitly requires
this appointed proxy to use a "substituted judgment" standard-
that is, to act on the basis of the incompetent patient's prior val-
ues and wishes-in making treatment decisions. Unlike most
other states, moreover, Florida puts bite into this requirement by
specifying that any family member who disagrees with the auto-
matically appointed proxy's decision can secure immediate judi-
cial review; and in these proceedings, the incompetent patient's
wishes must be determined by "clear and convincing evidence."13
Thus more explicitly and rigorously than most states, Florida
seeks to vindicate the incompetent patient's prior intentions.
It is therefore especially striking that the Florida courts
truncated their inquiry into Terri's prior wishes by restricting
§ 2133.08; Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.635 and § 127.505(12) and 127.535(4); South
Carolina: S.C. Code 1976 Ann. § 44-66-10 to -80; South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 34-
12C-1 to -8; Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann § 68-11-1801 to -1815, particularly § 68-11-1806;
Texas: Tex. [Health & Safety] Code Ann. § 166.039 (providing for joint surrogacy be-
tween supervising physician and family member, according to priority); Utah: Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-1105, -1105.5, -1107; Virginia: Va. Code § 54.1-2986; Washington: Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 7.70.065; West Virginia: W. VA. Code Ann. § 16-30-8; Wisconsin: Wisc.
Stat. Ann. § 50.06 (applicable only for certain facility admissions).
10. See, e.g., Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993), section 5 (c); Fla. Stat.
765.401(1)(c), (e) (2000).
11. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act at section 5 (b). See Comment, at p. 16 ("If
an individual does not designate a surrogate... subsection (b) applies a default rule for
selecting a family member to act as a surrogate. Like all default rules, it is not tailored to
every situation, but incorporates the presumed desires of a majority of those who find
themselves so situated.").
12. For consideration of this constitutional claim, see text accompanying notes 31-
36, infra.
13. Fla. Stat. § 765.105 (2000), In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15
(Fla. 1990), In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176.179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
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their attention to Terri's views about life-prolonging medical
treatment while they failed to ask whether she would have given
preferential deference to her husband or to her parents in their
conflict over this question. The courts assumed that Terri would
simply decide the treatment question for herself without any
consideration of deference to one or another family member.
One explanation for this unexamined assumption is that the
courts were ideologically blinded by the conventional idea of
autonomy that has taken hold in our legal culture-the idea that
"autonomous choice" implies a self-regarding rational actor who
bases his decisions entirely on utilitarian calculation of his own
self-interest. 4 The possibility that Terri Schiavo might have
wanted to defer to her husband's or to her parent's wishes in
preference to her own about treatment prolongation simply van-
ishes from this cich6d but nonetheless culturally powerful con-
ceptualization.
The judges of Florida court of appeals revealed the distort-
ing grip of this conventional conceptualization in the opinion
they rendered in 2003, the fourth of their numerous reviews of
Terri's case. Judge Chris Altenbernd, writing for the Court,
stated:15
The judges on this panel are called upon to make a collective,
objective decision concerning a question of law. Each of us,
however, has our own family, our own loved ones, our own
children. From our review of the videotapes of Mrs. Schiavo,
despite the irrefutable evidence that her cerebral cortex has
sustained the most severe of irreparable injuries, we under-
stand why a parent who had raised and nurtured a child from
conception would hold out hope that some level of cognitive
function remained. If Mrs. Schiavo were our own daughter,
we could not but hold to such a faith.
But in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that
loving parents have for their children. It is about Theresa
Schiavo's right to make her own decision, independent of her
parents, and independent of her husband. In circumstances
such as these, when families cannot agree, the law has opened
the doors of the circuit courts to permit trial judges to serve as
surrogates or proxies to make decisions about life-prolonging
14. This is the so-called "unencumbered self" critically examined by Michael Sandel
in DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
(1996).
15. Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla.
2d DCA 2003).
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procedures.... It is a necessary function if all people are to be
entitled to a personalized decision... independent of the sub-
jective and conflicting assessments of their friends and rela-
tives....
At the conclusion of our first opinion we stated: In the final
analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was
whether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo. .. would choose to
continue the constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in
hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her missing
brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural
death process to take its course and for her family members
and loved ones to be free to continue their lives.
This is a heart-felt statement. The formal solemnity of Judge
Altenbernd's reference to "Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo"
testifies to his appreciation of the gravity of his court's role.
He is admirably open in acknowledging the conflict that he
and the other judges on the panel feel between their commit-
ment to "objectivity" and their subjective understanding and
sympathy with the unwillingness, even the inability, of Terri's
parents to abandon hope for her. "If Mrs. Schiavo were our own
daughter, we could not but hold to such a faith." But Judge Al-
tenbernd failed to see that Terri herself might have extended the
same sympathetic understanding to her parents and might have
resolved to act on that understanding. In the sad light of her par-
ents' desperate clinging to her, Terri might have decided that "in
the end, this case is... about the aspirations that loving parents
have for their children." Terri might have concluded that she
could best honor their love by deferring to their passionate wish
that she remain alive, notwithstanding the gravity of her impair-
ment. Would she insist on dying-as Judge Altenbernd imag-
ined-to "permit... her family members and loved ones to be
free to continue their lives," if they pleaded with her that they
did not want this freedom?
Framing the question in these terms would not, of course,
have simplified the judges' task. It would have vastly, even hope-
lessly, complicated their proclaimed effort to implement her val-
ues and preferences. If they had concluded that Terri valued
loyalty to her family more than any isolated calculation of her
own self-interest (or, more precisely, that her conception of self-
interest included honoring others in a loving relationship with
her), the judges must then decide how Terri would have ranked
the conflicting requests from her parents and her husband.
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The irrebuttable presumption in most state laws preferring
spouses over parents as automatic proxies overlooks the dra-
matic alteration in the psychology of intimate relationships that
occurs when a previously competent adult becomes incompetent
and entirely dependent on others for caretaking. This status ech-
oes the utter dependency of childhood and the centrality of the
parent-child relationship. Spouses can, of course, adapt to their
adult partner's altered status. But parents have already experi-
enced this dependency relationship and can often renew it more
readily than a spouse and, for this reason alone, might well be
preferred by the now-incompetent, childish adult. Even the adult
children of a now-incompetent adult have had more direct ex-
perience of a dependency relationship than the spouse and, for
this reason alone, might be more capable and more welcomed in
reversing caretaking roles with their now-needy parent. Thus it is
not at all clear that a "presumed majority" of adults, if rendered
incompetent, would conclusively prefer their spouse to their
parents or their adult children as health care proxy.
Terri might have provided unambiguous guidance for an-
swering this question if she had previously appointed her hus-
band or her parents as her health-care proxy. She had not done
so; and though, as noted, Florida law filled in this blank for her,
it also provided that other family members could challenge her
spouse/proxy's decisions, requiring a demonstration in court of
"clear and convincing evidence" about her wishes. The question
thus presented was whether Terri would have preferred to be
seen as a "loving wife" or a "loving daughter" in circumstances
where she was obliged to choose between these two intensely
valued self-depictions.
According to testimony in the 2000 probate court proceed-
ing, Terri had discussed with various relatives and friends the
possibility that she would become incompetent and dependent
on life-prolonging technology. But there was no testimony that
she had ever anticipated conflict between her husband and her
parents about her reliance on such technology. By all accounts,
Terri, Michael and the Schindlers had been closely and harmo-
niously involved with one another, not only before Terri's cere-
brovascular accident in 1990 but for some three years thereafter.
When they first married in1984, Terri and Michael lived in her
parents' house in Philadelphia. In 1986, the couple moved to
Florida and lived rent-free in a condominium owned by the
Schindlers; a year later, the Schindlers themselves decided to
move to St. Petersburg near Terri and Michael who, by then, had
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moved into their own home. In 1991, immediately following
Terri's hospitalization, Michael and the Schindlers jointly pur-
chased and moved together into a larger home which, they an-
ticipated, would be suitable for Terri's caretaking when she had
recovered sufficiently to leave the hospital.16 It is thus unlikely
that Terri ever imagined even hypothetically the prospect that
she might have to choose between her husband and her parents
in determining her own preference for life-prolonging treatment.
The breach in the relationship between Michael and the
Schindlers first erupted in 1993. The occasion was a disagree-
ment about the disposition of funds which Michael had obtained
in a medical malpractice lawsuit he had initiated on Terri's be-
half, successfully claiming that her physicians' negligence in pre-
scribing a weight-loss diet for her had been responsible for her
anoxic event. Terri had been awarded $700,000 in damages on
her own account and Michael received $300,000 for his loss of
consortium with Terri. In 1993, a heated conversation took place
between Michael and Robert Schindler about the disposition of
the loss of consortium funds. In his testimony seven years later,
Michael asserted that Terri's father had demanded some portion
of those funds notwithstanding the absence of any legal basis for
his demand.17 (Florida law provided no compensable damages
for parents based on injuries suffered by their adult children
unless there were no other related survivors. 8) Robert Schindler
subsequently explained that he sought some substantial portion
of the award to Michael, not on his own account but to assure
that additional funds would be available for Terri's medical care
since Michael had recently begun a romantic relationship with
another woman with whom he subsequently resided and fa-
thered two children. 19
Viewing this breach in its most sympathetic perspective on
Michael's side, by 1993 it was apparent that he had permanently
lost any possibility of renewing an intimate relationship with his
wife; his decision to become romantically involved with another
woman did not diminish his grief or his belief in his moral and
16. See transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 23, 28, 33, File No. 90-2908GD-
003, Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida, Probate Division, January 24, 2000. Cf. the
following exchange between Michael and his attorney: "Q. [H]ow would you describe the
relationship you and Terri had with Mr. and Mrs. Schindler? ... A.... In my own opinion, I
thought we were pretty close." Id at 35.
17. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 58-60.
18. Fla. Stat. § 768.21 (2000).
19. E-mail from Barbara Weller (bweller@gibbsfirm.com) to Robert Burt, May 14,
2005,11:15 am (on file with author).
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legal entitlement to compensation for the medical negligence re-
sponsible for his loss. Viewed most sympathetically on the
Schindlers' side, it was clear by 1993 that Terri's need for inten-
sive medical care would be prolonged and increasingly costly;
while Michael might be justified in "continuing his life" in light
of Terri's grim condition, it was plausible for them to believe
that he was morally obliged to leave her with the funds he had
obtained because of his relationship with her, in order to help
meet her extraordinary medical needs which prompted his ac-
tions in seeking out another conjugal relationship.
It was not until 1999 that the dispute between Michael and
the Schindlers moved into the Florida courts. But disagreements
between them about Terri's treatment erupted virtually immedi-
ately after this first breach. In 1994, Terri developed a bladder
infection and, acting on the diagnosing physician's advice, Mi-
chael decided as her appointed proxy that antibiotic treatment
be withheld. This determination brought fierce objections from
the Schindlers as well as from staff of the nursing home where
Terri was a patient; and Michael relented. In the 2000 probate
court proceeding, Michael testified about this prior episode:20
Q. Back then in... 1994.... why didn't you pursue removal
of the feeding tube?
A. Because at that time my emotions were running. I
couldn't-I was ready to do the natural thing. I was not ready
to pull the feeding tube at that time.
Q. Even though you knew Terri wanted it?
A. Yes.
Q. Why were you not able?
A. It was -I was not ready for that yet.
This testimony offers a glimpse of an underlying question
that inevitably accompanies all decision-making about terminal
illnesses: the question when all of the participants-the patient
herself and her family members-are emotionally prepared to
accept the permanent severance of their relationships and the
finality of death.2 ' This is a wrenching decision for everyone in-
20. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 69-70.
21. The special difficulty for this acceptance regarding a family member in a persis-
tent vegetative state (as Terri Schiavo had been diagnosed) is shown in this account by
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volved. The patient, if she is mentally competent, may choose to
disregard or override others' suffering by accepting her death
before they are prepared to do so; and there can be clear moral
warrant for this choice. But it is a choice, and it does have inevi-
table consequences on the lives of survivors.
Because it is so wrenching for everyone, these decisions are
often accompanied by conflict-sometimes subdued, sometimes
floridly expressed-among patients (if they are able to interact),
families and physicians. Skilled clinicians can frequently help the
involved participants to work their way through to some mutu-
ally agreed decisions; but some conflicts do remain raw and un-
resolvable.2 The American legal system has struggled since the
the attorney for Nancy Cruzan's family who, unlike the Schindlers, were determined to
obtain judicial authorization for removing her life-prolonging feeding tube. In his book,
LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002), at pp. 131-32, William
Colby describes a bedside examination of Nancy by Dr. Ronald Cranford to confirm, in
preparation for his court testimony, that she was in a persistent vegetative state; also at
the bedside was a Public Broadcasting System television crew that the Cruzan family had
enlisted to help them in their efforts to have Nancy's feeding tube removed. Colby wrote:
Nancy's room had been filled with lawyers for both sides, the PBS crew, her
family and friends and doctors from [the hospital staff]. Joe watched from one
side of her bed, and Dr. Cranford moved to the other side.... He talked loudly.
"Nancy? Nancy. Hear me? Look at me, Nancy." He waited for a response,
but Nancy did not move.... Cranford next grabbed hold of Nancy's stiff right
leg and tried to bend it straight. She grimaced. Then he reached for the soft skin
on the inside of the upper part of her right arm, and held the pinch. Slowly, as if
she were a robot, Nancy's head lifted off the bed and turned. Her face locked on
her father's for about ten seconds, before she lowered just as slowly to the pil-
low.
"That's what really concerns you, when she looks like she looks?" Cranford
said to Joe, as he held the pinch. "That's all involuntary, even though it looks
like she's looking right at you, doesn't it, huh?" Cranford asked, talking fast as
he typically did.
"Right," Joe said, not sounding too sure.
"But you know she's not?"
"Right." Watching that scene, I thought, How could any layperson believe at
that moment that Nancy Cruzan was doing anything besides looking at her fa-
ther? That deception is part of the extreme cruelty of the persistent vegetative
state for loved ones left behind. For doctors who deal with PVS, though, the
grimacing and movement is simply another part of the diagnosis-primitive re-
flex reactions from a brain stem still intact, but not any indication of higher
brain function.
For families, watching these simple reflexive movements often remains emo-
tionally devastating to witness, and Cranford's exam appeared extremely diffi-
cult for Joe Cruzan, even though Nancy had been in this state for so many years.
As the PBS camera turned off at the end of the exam, tears came to Joe's eyes
and fell onto his cheeks. It seemed that he'd been trying to avoid crying with the
camera directly on him.
22. See J. Randall Curtis, et al., Missed Opportunities during Family Conferences
about End-of-Life Care in the Intensive Care Unit, 171 AM J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED.
844 (2005); J. Way, A. L. Back & J.R. Curtis, Withdrawing Life Support and Resolution
of Conflict with Families," 325 BRrr. MED. J. 1342 (2002).
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landmark decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Karen Quinlan3 case to devise an appropriate role for courts in
decision-making for incompetent patients. Quinlan itself did not
involve an intra-familial conflict; Karen's entire family were
agreed that her respirator should be removed but hospital offi-
cials refused to accept this course without a protective court or-
der. The most widely cited subsequent cases addressing a
claimed "right to die" for competent or incompetent patients
similarly have not involved family conflict but rather conflicts
with physicians or state officials. 2'
Florida, as noted, is one of the few states to have enacted
legislation that explicitly addresses the possibility of family con-
flict.' When Michael had finally decided that he was prepared to
insist on removal of Terri's feeding tube, he took the initiative in
seeking probate court review because he knew her parents
would object. In practical terms, the Florida legislative scheme
meant that decision-making for incompetent patients remained a
family matter only so long as there was unanimous agreement
among family members. At the moment, however, when one
family member disagrees with the others with sufficient ada-
mance to seek judicial involvement, the probate judge displaces
the family as dispositive decision-maker. To be sure, the judge is
obliged by the statute to exercise "substitute judgment," to effec-
tuate the incompetent patient's prior preferences; and for this
purpose, the judge takes proffered testimony from family mem-
bers and friends. But Florida law specified that when Michael
sought probate court review, he necessarily and irrevocably
placed the judge in charge of making treatment decisions for
Terri. The Florida Court of Appeals made this clear in Terri's
case a year after the probate judge's initial order had been en-
tered:
[T]he parties in this emotional case have overlooked the na-
ture of the order entered on February 11, 2000.... The order
is not a standard legal judgment, but an order in the nature of
a mandatory injunction compelling certain actions by the
guardian and, indirectly, by the health care providers....
[T]he trial court was not actually giving the guardian discre-
tion on whether to discontinue the life-prolonging procedures.
23. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
24. See the extensive list of state cases discussed in the Court's opinion in Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 269-75.
25. See supra note 13.
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The guardian was obligated to obey the circuit court's deci-
sion and discontinue the treatment.
Until the moment in March 2005 when Terri's feeding tube
was withdrawn, the popular press portrayed this dispute as a
continuing conflict between Terri's husband and parents. But
this was wrong. The parents were in conflict with the probate
judge; Michael was no longer his wife's guardian except in an
empty, formal sense. The trial court was in charge.2V As the
Court of Appeals admitted, "It may be unfortunate that when
families cannot agree, the best forum we can offer for this pri-
vate, personal decision is a public courtroom and the best deci-
sion-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior knowledge of
the ward, but the law currently provides no better solution..."
More is lost in the public proceeding than the family's pri-
vacy from public view; and more is lost than the control assumed
over these familial decisions by a randomly assigned stranger.
Any possible family conversations about Terri's future become
frozen in a remote abstraction hardly recognizable as the way
that empathic human beings should interact with one another.
Once the judge resolved the conflicting testimony about Terri's
wishes, once he concluded that she had decided years earlier that
she would not want the feeding tube, there was no way that any-
one could turn back or have second thoughts. The Schindlers
could no longer appeal for understanding from their son-in-law
that, just as he had not been "ready" to see Terri's treatment
discontinued in 1994, they were still not ready. Even in the
unlikely event that this possibility of empathic understanding
from their son-in-law seemed worth pursuing, it could make no
difference. Michael was no longer responsible for Terri's treat-
ment; the judge was in command. Indeed, the very availability of
judicial intervention created disincentives for conflicting family
members to interact with one another on a face-to-face basis. In
the 2000 probate court hearing, Michael testified that since their
open breach in 1993, he and the Schindlers had never spoken di-
rectly; they only saw one another and conversed-if one could
26. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 558 (2d DCA Fla. 2001).
27. In the final proceedings before Terri's death, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit misunderstood this fact in holding that withdrawal of her feeding tube was
not "state action" because Michael Schiavo had merely obtained judicial authorization
for his decision to terminate treatment. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1289, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2005).
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call it that-in the conflicting testimony they offered in the judi-
cial proceedings."
The Florida court of appeals ruefully observed that, in re-
sponse to family conflict about treatment choices for an incom-
petent patient, "the best decision-maker we can provide is a
judge with no prior knowledge of the ward, but the law currently
provides no better solution."
There is, however, a better solution than Florida law pro-
vided. The law should not have intervened to settle any dispute
among family members about whether to withdraw medical
treatment from an incompetent patient when the disputed action
would lead to the patient's death. Life-prolonging treatment
should be withdrawn only when all involved members of the pa-
tient's family agree. If there is dissent among the family, then
life-prolonging treatment should be continued. There should be
no option to take this dispute away from the family and have it
conclusively resolved by some outsider, whether a judge or some
other stranger such as panel of physicians or a hospital ethics
committee.
There is a role for outsiders-that is, to counsel the family
members, to facilitate conversation among them that might lead
to some consensus. But this counseling role is radically different
from what Florida law prescribes in supplanting the family with a
judge; it is also radically different from the laws of most other
states in appointing one member of the family as health care
proxy and thereby effectively favoring him in any family dispute,
notwithstanding the incompetent patient's prior failure to make
this choice.
II. PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FAMILY
PRIVACY IN TERRI SCHIAVO'S CASE
As a matter of practical experience, there is good reason to
believe that prolonged family disputes about withdrawing treat-
ment are quite rare. Disputes do occur, within families or be-
tween families and physicians' but these disputes are typically
28. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony at p. 63.
29. See C. M. Breen, et al., Conflict Associated with Decisions to Limit Life-
Sustaining Treatment in Intensive Care Units, 16 J. GEN'L INT. MED. 283 (2001); K.
H.Abbot, et al., Families Looking Back: One Year after Discussion of Withdrawal or
Withholding of Life-Sustaining Support, 29 CR1T.CARE MED. 197 (2001); M.D. Fetters, L.
Churchill & M. Danis, Conflict Resolution at End of Life, 29 CRIT. CARE MED. 921
(2001).
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resolved in days or at most weeks. In medical settings with most
experience in these matters, skilled, effective clinicians are avail-
able to counsel families and assist them in avoiding the kind of
pitched battle that developed in Terri Schiavo's case. According
to published accounts as well as informal conversations that I
have had with many clinicians involved in end-of-life care, the
vast majority-well over 95% -of family disputes are resolved in
this way. 0 As a practical matter, moreover, the availability of le-
gal intervention can distort the interaction among the disputing
family members. As the Schiavo case illustrates, the very avail-
ability of the judge as a back-up decision-maker tempts some or
all of the disputants to cut off conversation and only "tell it to
the judge."
Family resistance may, on occasion, obstruct the capacity of
health care providers to avert painful conditions or abusive in-
flictions on incompetent patients. Families (or some members of
families) may resist appropriate use of opioids to alleviate pain
or may insist on aggressive CPR, involving the likelihood of bro-
ken bones, when such interventions are demonstrably unable to
prolong life. This kind of abuse is not unique to intra-family con-
flicts; it may occur even with unanimity among family members.
In either event, coercive state intervention is justified to override
family wishes in order to remedy this abuse.
But this kind of justifiable intervention is not at stake in the
circumstances of the Schiavo case. The rationale for the Schiavo
intervention is to remedy dignitary injury, to ensure that the in-
competent patient's prior wishes and values are honored not-
withstanding her failure to have formally specified her intentions
in advance. Where there is disagreement among family mem-
bers, and no formal prior indication of preference by the patient
for one of the disputants, the patient's dignitary interest in hav-
ing her prior wishes honored is considerably attenuated by the
inevitable difficulty in determining her prior wishes with any
reasonable degree of certainty. Even where patients have previ-
ously completed advance directives, empirical studies indicate
that most patients would want their prior instructions disre-
garded in deference to the contrary wishes of their families and
physicians."
30. See supra note 22.
31. In the most extensive empirical investigation of this question, the researchers
found that some seventy-eight percent of seriously ill patients expressed this preference.
C.M. Puchalski, et al., Patients Who Want Their Family and Physician to Make Resuscita-
tion Decisions for Them: Observations from SUPPORT and HELP, 48 J. AMER.
440
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The fundamental question in designing legal responses to
family disagreement about life-prolonging treatment for an in-
competent patient is not whether the state should value prolon-
gation of life over death no matter what quality of life might
thereby be preserved. The fundamental question is whether the
state should value the specific wishes of family members for pro-
longation over those members opposed to prolongation where
the incompetent patient has left no clear prior instruction, where
the patient's suffering from prolongation is limited to dignitary
injury and where considerable emotional suffering will be im-
posed on different family members as a result either of prolonga-
tion or termination of her life. "Practicality" gives no answer to
this question. Some means for choosing between either prolon-
gation or discontinuation of the patient's life must of course be
provided for this binary decision. There are, however, many
equally practicable but different means available for making this
choice: judicial fact-finding, automatic appointment of a family
member based on status rather than substantive commitment to
prolongation or discontinuation of treatment, a default rule that
provides for prolongation of treatment until all intimately af-
fected family members agree.
Indeed, in response to a family dispute or dispute between
family and clinicians, it would be practicable to resolve the ques-
tion of prolongation or termination by the flip of a coin. Momen-
tarily imagining a state law to this effect provides an entry point
for considering whether state legislatures are free to adopt any
conceivable technique for conflict resolution or whether there
are some values of constitutional dimension that must govern
legislative choice.
My own intuition is that a publicly dictated decision be-
tween life and death based on a coin flip would be literally too
flippant, too inattentive to the gravity of the decision. A coin flip
would be so erratic and irrational in its impact as to violate the
very idea of law. The randomness of state mechanisms for im-
posing death was the central flaw that the Supreme Court identi-
fied in overturning all extant capital punishment laws in Furman
v. Georgia.2 Termination of life-prolonging treatment is not im-
position of a criminal penalty; but Furman rested much more on
equal protection than on the Eighth Amendment command
against cruel and unusual punishment. On this ground, state-
GERIATRIC SOC. S84 (2000).
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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imposed coin flips to resolve family disputes about termination is
surely as arbitrary-as much reliant on a random "lightning
strike 33-as the processes condemned in Furman.
Is resolution of a family dispute about termination by auto-
matic appointment of one of the disputants-without any atten-
tion to the merits of the dispute or the prior wishes of the in-
competent subject of the dispute-any less arbitrary than a coin
flip?
In the absence of any dispute, it is surely not arbitrary for a
state to choose one relative rather than other plausible candi-
dates to make medical decisions on behalf of an incompetent pa-
tient. Requiring concurrence for any decision among an entire
family has at least two undesirable consequences. First, it is diffi-
cult, often even imponderable, to determine as an abstract
proposition who might be eligible for the status of "family."
Should genealogical charts dictate the result? If so, what degree
of relationship should be requisite for assembling the collective
decision-makers-through first cousins? What about in-laws?
And so forth.
A common-sense determination of "family member" is pos-
sible, however, where automatic appointment of one member (a
spouse, say) serves only as a default rule which is overridden if
an actual dispute arises about terminating treatment. The erup-
tion of an actual dispute in itself connotes that all of the dispu-
tants feel some intense connection to the patient and the specific
participants in the dispute can thus be identified as "family" so
long as there is some prior emotionally involved relationship (so
as to exclude intrusions from the "officious intermeddlers"
spawned by the polarized politics of our time)."'
Second, if some listed assemblage of "family members"
rather than a single appointee were required from the outset, be-
33. As Justice Stewart pungently characterized the irrational imposition of capital
punishment, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
34. The practical effect of this default rule would serve the goal that the Supreme
Court has identified in its decisions providing constitutional protection to relations be-
tween biological parents and children; the Court has held that actual day-to-day in-
volvement with children's lives rather than a biological connection is the key for deter-
mining a constitutionally protected relationship between parent and child. See Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In envisioning some
degree of constitutional protection against state termination of foster parents' custody,
the Court similarly gave weight to the actuality of relations with the foster children.
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("[Where] the foster family... hold[s] the
same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill[s] the same socializing func-
tion as a natural family,... we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of
unrelated individuals.")
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fore any termination dispute had arisen, this could in itself tend
to breed disputes by imposing responsibility on some family
member who otherwise would have been disengaged from the
decisions. Automatic appointment of a single proxy as a default
rule in itself serves as a marker for the intensity of other family
members' commitment. If, that is, an "actual dispute" is required
to override the default appointment of, say, the spouse, this re-
quirement in effect serves as a screening mechanism for demon-
strating a personally intense stake in the termination decision by
other family members because they must take an initiative to
participate in the decision. These considerations thus indicate
the rationality of a state law appointing one family member as
proxy decision-maker, so long as there is no actual dispute
within the family about such decisions. When an actual dispute
arises, however, the automatic appointment mechanism fails ut-
terly to satisfy even a minimal test for rationality.
But more than minimal rationality should be required to
justify state interventions in family disputes about terminating
life-prolonging treatment for incompetent patients. Three differ-
ent pathways can lead to this heightened scrutiny. The first
pathway was initially charted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in its landmark Quinlan ruling. In that case, the court began by
holding that a competent patient had a constitutional right to
choose whether to accept or discontinue life-prolonging medical
treatment. Karen Ann Quinlan was, of course, not competent to
make this choice; but the court ruled that her incompetence was
not an acceptable basis for depriving her of her constitutional
right. In order to vindicate her right, the court held, some legal
mechanism must be provided for determining what decision she
would have made if she were competent.
The Quinlan decision generated an outpouring of judicial
rulings and legislation in other states, essentially endorsing its
mandate. Some fifteen years later, this widespread effective rati-
fication of the Quinlan decision was explicitly cited by the U. S.
Supreme Court in Cruzan as the basis for its assumption that a
competent person had a constitutional right to dictate with-
drawal of treatment, including artificial provision of nutrition
and hydration.3' The question specifically at issue in Cruzan was
whether states could require "clear and convincing" evidence
35. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647,664 (1976).
36. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,275 (1990) ("The princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
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rather than a mere preponderance before concluding that an in-
competent patient would have chosen to discontinue life-
prolonging treatment. While the Court majority held that this
higher burden of proof did not violate the Constitution, the
question presented was not whether the state was obliged to give
some dispositive weight to an incompetent patient's prior wishes;
the Court ruled only that states had discretion in specifying the
quantum of proof necessary for determining those wishes.
The Court at least implied, however, that the state was
obliged to "safeguard the personal element of this choice" be-
tween "life and death" for an incompetent person. 7 Justice
O'Connor, moreover, specifically concurred in the Court's opin-
ion with the explicit suggestion that the state was affirmatively
obliged to provide some effective mechanism for determining an
incompetent patient's actual wishes. 8 Automatic appointment of
proxy for an incompetent person who had indicated no prior
preference for this proxy would not in itself be sufficient to pro-
tect an incompetent patient's constitutional right to choose
medical treatment.
A second pathway for heightened scrutiny can be deduced
from the constitutionally protected status of family relationships
as such. Insofar as a constitutionally protected family relation-
ship exists with an incompetent patient, the state cannot exclude
that family member from decisions about the death of that pa-
tient without some specific, highly persuasive basis.39 The strong-
est case for such a protected participation in decision-making,
based on existing precedents, is for spouses and for parents of
minor children. Thus for spouses, the clearly established consti-
tutional right to marry necessarily implies state deference to the
spouses' mutual wish to continue the relationship;'o when one
spouse becomes incompetent, this in itself provides no warrant
for the state to impose termination of the relationship (whether
37. 497 U.S. at 280.
38. 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I... write separately to emphasize
that the Court does not today decide the issue whether a State must also give effect to
the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker.... In my view, such a duty may well be con-
stitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treat-
ment.").
39. Thus, for example, where a husband's beating was responsible for his wife's co-
matose condition and termination of life-prolonging treatment would escalate criminal
charges from assault to murder, the husband's obvious conflict of interest should disqual-
ify him from decision-making authority.
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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through divorce or through death) over the other spouse's objec-
tion.
For parents of minor children, there is also well-established
constitutional grounds for requiring presumptive state deference
to parental child-rearing decisions generally." The state's re-
sponsibility to preserve parental relations with their minor chil-
dren would seem to create an almost absolute barrier to state-
imposed termination of a child's life-prolonging treatment.'
Many circumstances might be imagined where parental control
of medical decisions would disserve their child's interest; refusal
of state-required vaccination is the most commonly cited exam-
ple from the constitutional case-law.43 But it is difficult to imag-
ine plausible invocation by the state of the child's best interest in
overriding parental wishes to continue life-prolonging treat-
ment.44
To identify a constitutional basis for requiring state defer-
ence to the wishes of a spouse or minor child's parent for life-
prolonging medical treatment does not necessarily imply equal
deference for their wishes to terminate treatment. The underly-
ing basis for the constitutional guarantee is not for spousal or pa-
rental control over another person's life. The underlying basis is
to honor spousal or parental interests in the preservation of their
protected relationship with that person. Death ends the relation-
ship. The willingness of a spouse or parent themselves to end
their relationship by directing termination of life-prolonging
treatment is not inherently wrong or even suspect. But that will-
ingness does open the possibility that the state is entitled to as-
sert its contrary communal interest in preserving the life of the
spouse or child. So, for example, the state can legitimately act to
protect a child with Downs Syndrome whose parents refuse to
authorize life-prolonging surgery, as in the notorious 1982 Indi-
41. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
42. Compare Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), requiring the heightened
standard of "clear and convincing evidence" before the state may remove a child from
her parent's custody. In Cruzan, the Court drew a direct analogy between this constitu-
tional requirement established by Santosky and decisions to terminate life-prolonging
medical treatment. 497 U.S. at 284.
43. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
44. Extreme examples justifying state override of parental decisions against termi-
nating life-prolonging treatment might, for example, be an abusive parent resisting his
child's death to avoid criminal prosecution for murder, as discussed supra note 39 regard-
ing an abusive husband, or parental insistence on the infliction of pain and physical injury
to perform CPR in a palpably impossible effort to prolong the life of an imminently ter-
minal child.
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ana Baby Doe case.' So too, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Cruzan, the state is not obliged to defer to parents' wishes to
terminate life-prolonging treatment merely based on their status
as parents.'
Even assuming that the Constitution does protect the life-
prolonging wishes of a spouse or minor child's parent, there is no
direct case-law support for finding similar protection for the par-
ents of an adult child. But if we look beyond what the Supreme
Court has disparagingly called "narrowly defined family pat-
terns, ' we can see a broader conception of family relationships
for which the Court has demanded constitutional respect-a
conception that would readily include the relationship between
parents and adult children. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance which had the effect
of forbidding Mrs. Moore from sharing her house with her adult
son, his child and her grandchild by another adult child. The
Court focused attention on the relationship between grand-
mother and grandchild in invalidating this peculiar ordinance;
but its reasoning extends beyond this. Thus the Court stated:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradi-
tion of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional rec-
ognition.... [Tjhe accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained
over the centuries and honored throughout our history,....
supports a larger conception of the family.... Especially in
times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic
need, the broader family has tended to come together for mu-
tual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home
life.
48
This same respect for "the broader family" was evident in
the landmark Quinlan ruling where the New Jersey Supreme
Court explicitly insisted-and "repeated," as they said, "for the
sake of emphasis and clarity"-that, notwithstanding the status
of Karen Ann's father as her legally appointed guardian, any de-
cision to terminate her life-prolonging treatment must be based
45. See ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH Is THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECTIONS
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE 161-62 (2002).
46. 497 U.S. at 285-86.
47. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 495,506 (1977).
48. Id at 504-05.
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on "the concurrence of [her] guardian and family."49 The Quin-
lan court did not identify the constitutional basis for this re-
quirement; it was in uncharted territory in 1976. But in our un-
derstanding of the roots of the constitutional rule that has
emerged from Quinlan,-5 it is important to see the New Jersey
court's assumption that concurrence among the family of an in-
competent patient, and not simply the decision of one legally
recognized "head of household," was essential for legitimating
the momentous decision to withdraw life-prolonging treatment
from an incompetent adult.
If the state is constitutionally required presumptively to de-
fer to the wishes of any family member for continuation of life-
prolonging treatment of an adult child but not required to give
equal deference even to a unanimous family wish for termina-
tion, a clear direction emerges for responding to family disputes
such as the Schiavo case.5 Like any constitutionally based com-
mand, this required deference to any family member's insistence
on life-prolongation could be rebutted in specific cases by some
sufficiently weighty state interest. With one exception, however,
it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where the state could
adequately justify imposing death on an incompetent patient
over the objections of a family member. If the patient were suf-
fering considerable pain, this could always be remedied by some
drug regime.52 In any event, patients in a persistent vegetative
state, as Terri Schiavo was diagnosed, do not experience any
pain; this incapacity is one of the hallmarks of the diagnosis.
The one exception which could justify a state command for
termination of life-prolonging treatment is to honor the incom-
petent patient's clear prior directive that, in the event of conflict
among family members, she had specified who should prevail
over others and that person was pressing for termination of
49. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55,355 A.2d 647,671 (1976) (emphasis added).
50. The "seminal" status of Quinlan was explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
51. Cf. the Supreme Court's approval in Cruzan of a constitutionally relevant dis-
tinction between decisions to provide and to terminate life-prolonging treatment, suffi-
cient to justify the added burden of proof by the state for termination decisions. Citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Court stated, "In Santosky, one of the fac-
tors which led the Court to require proof by clear and convincing evidence in a proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights was that a decision in such a case was final and irrevoca-
ble. Santosky, supra, at 759. The same must surely be said of the decision to discontinue
hydration and nutrition of a patient such as Nancy Cruzan, which all will agree will result
in her death." 497 U.S. at 284.
52. See BURT, supra note 45, at 216-17 nn. 11-15.
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treatment. 3 It would not be enough if the patient had previously
expressed a generalized wish for termination of treatment; I
would say that the patient must have specifically envisioned fam-
ily conflict and chosen sides in advance. For most people, the
eruption of family conflict dramatically changes the context of
prior decisions that they may have reached without clear realiza-
tion that a family member would consider himself grievously in-
jured by that decision. Unless the incompetent patient had ex-
plicitly considered this possibility and rejected its relevance for
herself, the state interest in vindicating autonomous choice is too
speculative, too insubstantial, to overcome the moral and emo-
tional force of family reluctance to accepting the patient's
death.'
This insistence on a clear prior directive by the incompetent
patient conclusively resolving family conflict might seem too
demanding. It is conceivable, for example, that objection to ter-
mination might come from a family member who had been es-
tranged from the patient for a long period of time-long enough
and bitterly enough that it would be plausible to conclude that
the patient would not have wanted to defer to the resistance of
this particular person. This kind of determination would, how-
ever, require detailed factual inquiry into the particularities of
family relationships. This requirement implicates the third con-
stitutional law pathway that leads to the requirement for state
deference to, as opposed to forced resolution of, family disputes.
This third pathway is a process implication arising from the con-
stitutional requirement that the state not intrude on the private
domain of family relationships.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Troxel v. Granville55
is most directly relevant in establishing this pathway. In that
case, the state of Washington had enacted legislation providing
access to court for "any person" challenging parental decisions
to deny visitation rights with their children; in such proceedings,
the statute directed the judge to decide the dispute based on the
53. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that it was "not faced with the
question of whether a State might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if
competent and probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a
desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for her by that
individual." 497 U.S. at 287 n.12. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor strongly
suggested that she would endorse such a constitutional rule. Id at 289-90.
54. The insubstantiality of this claimed state interest is underscored by the empiri-
cal evidence, cited in note 31, supra, that most patients want their prior directives disre-
garded in deference to the differing views of their families and physicians.
55. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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"best interests" of the children. The Court invalidated this stat-
ute because of the "breathtakingly broad"56 discretion granted to
a judge to "award visitation whenever [she] thought [she] could
make a better decision than a child's parent had done."' The
Court left open the possibility of validating a more narrowly
drawn statute (limited, for example, to disputes between parents
and grandparents) with more precisely defined standards than
"best interests of the child" to govern judicial interventions. The
unstructured breadth of the judicial intervention into family de-
cision-making was the grounds for its invalidation.
In family disputes about terminating life-prolonging treat-
ment for an incompetent patient, the process requirement that
state interventions be constrained by clearly defined, limiting
standards appears virtually impossible to satisfy unless the in-
competent patient herself had previously indicated her prefer-
ence among the disputing parties or if continuation of the life-
prolonging treatment was likely to inflict serious physical pain or
injury on the patient. As in Terri Schiavo's case, judicial resolu-
tion of a family dispute based solely on the judge's assessment of
the incompetent patient's dignitary interest in discontinuing
treatment would not satisfy the process demands in Troxel.
A further consideration, not present in Troxel, amplifies the
constitutional importance of state abstention from resolving
family disputes about life-prolonging treatment. Insofar as de-
termination of an incompetent patient's dignitary interests in
discontinuing treatment depends on the patient's prior wishes
and values, a court would inevitably be drawn into fact-finding
about issues heavily freighted with religious significance for most
people in American society. Terri Schiavo's case exemplifies
this; quite aside from the frenzied participation of outsiders in
the late stages of this dispute, her parents consistently main-
tained that, as an observant Catholic, Terri would never have
agreed to discontinue her treatment unless it was clear that she
was already terminally ill. Her husband's insistence that Terri
would have wanted to accelerate her death if she were in a per-
sistent vegetative state rested on the implicit premise that Catho-
lic Church teachings to the contrary had not been determinative
for her. The Florida probate judge purported to rest his decision
exclusively on his findings about Terri's specific intentions; but
56. Id at 67 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring).
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in determining her intentions, he could not avoid resolving an
explicit religious doctrinal dispute.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion and its stricture
against state-established religions together require that secular
courts refrain from resolving religious doctrinal disputes. In
Jones v. Wolf,5" the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle but
added the proviso that the state might rely on "neutral princi-
ples" to resolve religious disputes so long as those principles
were framed "in purely secular terms, and [did] not.., rely on
religious precepts." 9 State reliance on an incompetent patient's
prior appointment of a health care proxy as the basis for resolv-
ing family disputes about life-prolonging treatment would ap-
pear suitably "neutral"; the state could rely, that is, on the prima
facie meaning of the prior directive without inquiring into the
now-incompetent patient's religious or non-religious motivation
for making this directive. In the absence of an executed prior di-
rective, however, particularized inquiry into the patient's atti-
tudes toward life-prolonging treatment would necessarily draw
courts into fact-finding about "religious precepts."
Where the incompetent patient had not executed an ad-
vance directive or health care proxy, state specification of auto-
matic rules for proxy designation would be sufficiently "neutral"
to satisfy the Jones v. Wolf stricture. But this automatic designa-
tion would only solve the First Amendment religion clause prob-
lems; the very feature that rendered this designation adequately
"neutral" is its complete irrelevance both to the specific issues in
the family dispute and to the prior preferences of the incompe-
tent patient in favoring one or another family member in this
dispute. This irrelevance is, however, precisely the reason al-
ready discussed that this "automatic" resolution of the family
dispute is constitutionally invalid on grounds of arbitrariness.,°
These, then, are the three pathways that lead to constitu-
tional protection from state-imposed termination of life-
prolonging treatment for an incompetent patient when even one
family member disagrees with this course. To protect the indi-
vidual right to choose termination, substantial doubt must be ac-
knowledged about whether the incompetent patient would have
wanted treatment withdrawn in the face of disagreement by even
58. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
59. Id at 604.
60. See text accompanying notes 31-33, supra.
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one family member-unless the patient had explicitly antici-
pated the possibility of this disagreement and appointed some
other member as the dispositive decision-maker. To protect the
right of family members to preserve their relationships against
state termination, the refusal of one member to acquiesce in
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment must be honored
(whereas even the unanimous family agreement to terminate
treatment does not command comparable state respect because
this decision, however justifiable in its own terms, is not in the
service of preserving a familial relationship). To protect the fam-
ily from intrusive state investigation, disagreements within the
family about withdrawing treatment must be respected as such;
the religious doctrinal foundation of large numbers of such dis-
putes provides additional reason for state abstention from de-
tailed scrutiny or, a fortiori, from dispositive resolution.
Each of these three pathways independently supports the
right of family privacy from state-imposed termination of life-
prolonging treatment. Taken together, these three mutually rein-
force and amplify the basis for this constitutional claim.
III. CLINICIANS' BURDENS IN RESPECTING
FAMILY PRIVACY
Family disputes about terminating life-prolonging treatment
for an incompetent family member are invariably painful for
everyone involved. Health care clinicians who regularly confront
such disputes are not immune to this pain. To the contrary, their
regular involvement can be cumulatively wearing. Whatever ef-
fort they may feel impelled to exert to defend themselves against
this pain brings its own difficulty because the defense in itself
may feel like a betrayal of the medical profession's commit-
ment-in principle, if not always or easily in practice-to remain
engaged with and supportive of family's grief at the imminent
death of their loved one. A legal rule that automatically awards
proxy appointment to one among the disputants thus has consid-
erable attractions for clinicians by quickly ending the family dis-
pute and relieving them of any professional obligation to remain
engaged through extended conversation, negotiation, and plead-
ing with recalcitrant family members.
Clinicians know, however, in their heart of hearts, that
forced resolution of a family dispute leaves unreconciled mem-
bers with a burden of anger against other disputants that is likely
to complicate their grief. Clinicians know, in their heart of
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hearts, that prolonged involvement with families nursing them
toward consensus is the best kind of caretaking, the best way to
honor their professional obligations as caretakers. Even if the
law may appear to relieve them of their obligations, good clini-
cians know that forced resolution is not good for the families of
their patients and, for this reason in itself, is unlikely to honor
the prior preferences of their incompetent patients.
The fact is, moreover, that the laws in many jurisdictions
implicitly (and some even explicitly) already require family una-
nimity before life-prolonging treatment can be terminated, and
there has been no vocal outcry among clinicians in those jurisdic-
tions about difficulties in coping with family conflict. Though
most state statutes do provide for automatic proxy appointment
of single family members, five states-Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Michigan and Wyoming-explicitly provide for appointment of
multiple family members based on their individually expressed
wish to serve as proxies.61 Even for the states that provide auto-
matic appointment from a hierarchical list, when spouses are un-
available the statutes move to potentially multi-member catego-
ries (adult children or parents or adult siblings of the
incompetent patient). (Most Americans die in their 70s, and
men's life expectancy is some six years less than women's; thus
automatic proxy appointments for incompetent elderly widows
frequently devolve on adult children or siblings. 2) For multi-
member proxies such as adult children, some ten states explicitly
provide that disputed termination decisions should be resolved
by majority vote.63 Most states, however, eschew this weirdly
formalist response. ("Let's have a show of hands. Okay... three
to two for pulling the plug on Mom's respirator ... Let's do it.").
Most states say nothing about the resolution of conflict among
proxies in multi-member categories, thus implicitly requiring
unanimity before termination.
If substantial numbers of clinicians had been unable to deal
with familial conflicts within these multi-member classes, some
evidence for this and medical demand for statutory revisions
61. Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-18.5-101 to -1033; Idaho: Idaho Code § 39-
4303; Indiana: Ind. Code Ann. § 16-36-1-1 to -14 (West 2005); Michigan: Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 333.5651 to 5661, particularly § 333.5653(g) and .5655(b); Wyoming: Wyo.
Stat. § 3-5-209 and § 35-22-105.
62. See Committee on Care at the End of Ufe, Institute of Medicine, Approaching
Death: Improving Care at the End of Life (Marilyn Field & Christine Cassel, eds.) (Na-
tional Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997) at 35.
63. See, e.g., Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993), § 5 (c); Fla. Stat.
§ 765.401(1)(c), (e) (2000).
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would surely have surfaced; but there is no such protest and
from all appearances clinicians are able to cope."
Requiring family unanimity before terminating an incompe-
tent patient's life-prolonging treatment is thus not only required
by constitutional principles of respect for the patient's prior
wishes and of family privacy from state coercion. This require-
ment also follows from clinicians' professional role obligation to
alleviate rather than exacerbate family grief through forced reso-
lution of family disputes.
IV. A ROLE FOR CONGRESS IN PROTECTING
FAMILY PRIVACY
None of the courts, either state or federal, enlisted in Terri
Schiavo's case were presented with the constitutional arguments
that I have set out here for invalidating Florida's law providing
for judicial resolution of the family dispute about her treatment.
This is not surprising; even though I believe I have set out a
strong case for this result, there is no slam-dunk constitutional
law precedent directly on point. The very novelty of the argu-
ments does, however, mean that courts remain free to consider
them in the inevitable next case of intra-familial conflict about
terminating life-prolonging treatment.
This blank judicial slate presents a further opportunity-
that Congress could enact legislation under its Section 5 author-
ity to "enforce... the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 In its recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has been
quite restrictive in construing the extent of this congressional au-
thority. These restrictive constructions can be distilled into two
propositions: where the Court and Congress disagree about the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's judgment
always prevails; and the Court is not obliged to give any defer-
ence whatsoever to Congress's view of the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment." These propositions do not mean, however,
that Congress is barred from acting on its own interpretation of
its Section 5 authority where, as in this context, no court has pre-
64. For general data about the prevalence of family conflict regarding termination
of life-prolonging treatment and clinician capacity to assist resolution of this conflict, see
supra notes 22 and 29.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
66. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000).
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viously invalidated-much less, even ruled on-this interpreta-
tion.
There is, moreover, good reason for courts to give some in-
dependent weight to congressional judgment in considering
whether a constitutional principle of family privacy forbids state
intervention to resolve intra-familial disputes about terminating
life-prolonging treatment. There are clear financial implications
for such constitutional ruling. There is no systematically gath-
ered data available to determine the number of patients whose
families disagree about the continuation of life-prolonging
treatment, either currently or in the relevant recent past. Con-
gress has better capacity than courts for gathering such data.
More importantly, if Congress concludes that an important na-
tional purpose is served by forbidding states from imposing
treatment termination in the face of familial objection, Congress
should be willing to allocate federal funds to meet whatever
medical costs might follow from this conclusion. Legislation pro-
viding federal funds to support the exercise of a constitutional
right would fit more comfortably within the current constrictions
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress might
also, more modestly, invoke its spending power to condition
state receipt of funds on their adoption of a rule requiring family
consensus to terminate an incompetent patient's life-prolonging
treatment.67
There are adequate reasons for a court independently to
conclude that the Constitution requires continuation of this
treatment for so long as any family member insists; and for judi-
cial vindication of constitutional norms, financial implications
are irrelevant. But if Congress pledges federal financial re-
sources to support the claimed right, this should be relevant to
judicial construction of the existence of such right-not because
it would thereby be a fiscally manageable cost but because the
pledge in itself signifies a broadly held public moral consensus
about the importance of vindicating such right. As the Court has
held in other contexts,6 the existence of legislative enactments is
67. Congressional spending power is not immune from constitutional limitations.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). But if Congress may use its commerce
power to preempt state laws permitting medical use of marijuana, as the Supreme Court
recently held in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), there could surely be no bar to use
of congressional spending power to induce state adoption of this rule for termination of
life-prolonging medical treatment.
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (execution of juveniles); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded persons).
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relevant evidence to support judicial construction of constitu-
tional rights.
At the last stages of the Schiavo case, Congress acted to in-
volve the federal courts in determining whether constitutional
rights would be violated by the removal of her feeding tube. The
congressional intervention was, however, only jurisdictional;
Congress explicitly disavowed any substantive mandate for a
constitutional ruling in the case." The prospect remains open for
the Congress to return to its consideration of the issues raised by
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo's case-but, this time, to pro-
ceed at a more stately deliberative pace and, this time, to speak
substantively in support of a constitutional claim for family pri-
vacy.
69. See Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2005).
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